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Over the past four decades, the Nigerian State has evolved from a
federal polity characterised by politically strong regions to a
highly centralised system in which the so called federating
states have no real autonomous powers and are at the beck and
call of a strong centre in which enormous powers are invested in
the hands of one person and one institution, the president and
the presidency. This political transformation was carried out
mainly under military rule in a context in which excessive
corruption and primordial issues of ethnic, religious and
regional political domination have become central elements in the
country's political culture. Successive governments have slowly
but steadily lost their credibility and legitimacy as they are
perceived as selfish, corrupt, incompetent and parochial leaders
that have taken over power to line their pockets, and the pockets
of their kith and kin with largesse from public coffers, with the
steady decline of petroleum revenues since the late 1070's,
successive leaderships, of the rapacious political entrepreneurs
type have become more reckless in pirating State resources and in
so doing, they have weakened State capacity and precipitated
major economic hardship, especially under the regime of General
Babangida. In the context of the general political and economic
crisis that has gripped the country over the past decade, fears
of ethno-religious and regional domination have been growing in
the country and these fears are being translated into violent and
bloody conflicts that ressembles a return to Hobbesean state of
nature. As the number of conflicts and the death toll of ethno-
religious strife increases, hate memories are accumulating,
people are getting more frightened, more violent and more
parochial in their thinking.
In his interesting analysis of the Yugoslavian imbroglio,
Ignatief£ posits that:
What Hobbes would have said, having lived through
religious civil war himself, is that when people
are sufficiently afraid, they will do anything.
There is one type of fear that is more devastating
in its impact than any other, the eyBtemic fear
that arises when a state beginB to collapse.
Ethnic hatred is the result of the terror which
arises when legitimate authority disintegrates
(1993:16).
The legitimacy of the modern State is linked to its capacity to
present itself as a provider of necessary public goods and more
important, a neutral arbiter that guarantees the security of all
sections of society, when the State is generally perceived as
serving the particularistic interests of one group, it starts
losing its legitimacy, and indeed, its authority. As State
capacity declines, fear of "the other" rises and people resort to
other levels of solidarity - religious, ethnic, regional etc, in
search of security.
THK MILITARY. THR TRANSITION PROGRAMME AHD THE REDUCTION OF
NIGERIAN POLITICAL SPACE
The terms patrimonialism and prebendalism are being used
increasingly, in African political science (Medard, 1982; Joseph,
1987; Theobald, 1982). They refer to the way in which people
with access to public offices in the continent use them for
private accumulation. Popular opposition to this form of
corruption has generally lead to repression by those who control
state power and the exclusion of a lot of people from the public
arena. The history of the repression and exclusion which the
African people have been subjected to has been motivated mainly
by the desire of ruling groups to protect avenues of corruption.
The result has been a reduction of political space. Almost all
the military regimes which took power after overthrowing the
first generation of politicians on the continent declared that
they took power in order to fight against corruption. It turned
out that each military regime became more corrupt than the regime
from which it took over power.
in Nigeria, soldiers have become the most important section of
the power elite and they have made a significant impact on the
political life of the country. The military power elite in the
country has always claimed that they were playing a role similar
to the one played by Cincinnatus (Oyovbaire, 1987:178). In Roman
mythology, Cincinnatus was the model par excellence o£ human
selfless determination and civic consciousness. He had been
invited by the representatives of the people in a period of
national decay to carry out a fundamental civic responsibility -
repair and reconstruct the decomposing institutions, structures,
and norms of the society. Having brilliantly carried out his
civic duty, he scorned the glory of power and the appeals for him
to remain as ruler and left the scene.
The soldiers in power in Nigeria have always had similar
pretentious. In January 1966, General Aguiyi ironsi who had
become Head of State after the coup d'Etat organised by the "Five
Majors", declared that he was a temporary impartial arbiter
accepting the responsibility of power only for the short time
that was necessary to reorganise the world of civilian politics
which would then take back the power that belongs to it. It was
for that reason that he did not take a political title like
President or Prime Minister and was satisfied with that of Head
of State. The three other military regimes that succeeded his
regime more or less remained faithful to this idea. A discernable
political culture evolved in Nigeria that deligitimated military
rule, except as a short "corrective" regimes intervening at
moments of political crisis; A certain form of professional
political ethical code developed for the Nigerian military. The
organisation of occasional military coup d'Etats for the
resolution of acute political crisis, the reorganisation of
structures and institutions and the organisation of elections.
The first military ruler to consciously and deliberately break
this tradition was the former Head of State, General Ibrahim
Babangida. He took the title of <president> and clearly embarked
along a trajectory of personal, as opposed to collective military
rule. For example, he dissolved and reconstituted the ruling
military council at will and informed his military colleagues of
his decisions rather than consult with then in the official
decision making bodies. He however pretended to remain within the
said political culture and even stated that "military regime is
an aberration" and that he had no intention of staying in power
beyond 1992, one of the years during which he promised to hand
over power to civilians.(1)
The Nigerian military has transformed the country's body politic
in a very significant manner. In the first place, the military
have entrenched the culture of public corruption established
earlier by civilian regimes. It is a major change, in the past,
corruption was corruption - unethical or illegal advantages
procured through official positions. Under the Babangida and the
current Abacha Administrations, what used to be known aB
corruption has become the art of government itself. There is a
(1) Want Africa, 20 avril 1987, p. 1897.
complete prebendalisation of state power and virtually all acts
by public officials involving public expenditure or public goods
of any kind leads to the appropriation of state finances or
property by officials.
The routine operations of government are being subjected to
prebendal rules. It is widely known for example that officials of
state governments and parastatals have to pay, as they put it,
<up front> a percentage of their statutory allocations to the
Presidency, Ministry of Finance and Central Bank officials before
their allocations are released. They in turn, simply take, their
own share, <up front>, from eo called government coffers.
Contractors who used to bribe officials for government contracts
have been completely sidelined. The President, military
governors, ministers etc simply allocate contracts to their own
front companies, and they don't even have to pretend they are
doing the job because nobody can dare pose questions. The
country's major resource, petroleum, is now allocated to
individuals who then sell their allocations to petroleum
companies. Custom officers have been reported to have refused to
release" equipment imported by government because they had not
been paid their percentage <up front>. Virtually all the major
drug barons arrested by the Agency set up to fight against the
narcotics business have been released, or rather, allowed to
escape, by their captors and most of the captured drugs have
"disappeared" from government security depots as the anti drug
squad have become the major pushers. There is even a major
struggle between different military and security agencies for the
control of the lucrative "drug prevention" business. The military
have succeeded in transforming corruption from a deviant activity
by public officials into the "raison d'etre" of the Nigerian
skate.
Secondly, the military have succeeded in destroying Nigerian
federalism, sacrificing it on the alter of over-centralisation.
The country's geopolitical realities have been completely
modified. The tripartite structure which had become quadripartite
with the creation of the Mid West in 1963, has changed
drastically as a result of the multiplication of States whose
number currently stands at 30. The multiplication of States has
produced a Jacobean effect, as has been explained by Kashim
Ibrahim, the last Governor of Northern Nigeria:
This increasing miniaturization of states consequent
on creation of puny states has also led to a loss of
some of the freedoms inherent in a federal system of
government. The system stresses unity and diversity
and a powerful federal or central government legally
so constituted, with a constellation of financially
subservient and dependent states. Such a system
lends itself to dictatorship because there is little
or no room for the stateB to manoeuvre. (Osuntokun,
1987:128). • : ^ ' f ^ .!t''f..•"'•
Nigeria thus findB itself now with a federation that is for all
practical purposes a unitary system with some devolution of power
to the States. This tendency was reinforced after the decision by
former President Babangida on October 1, 1988. to scrap
Ministries of Local Governments and establish a Directorate in
the Presidency to direct local governments. Under the current
Abacha Administration, the Presidency is insisting on vetting not
only state executive councils but also locoal government
caretaker committees.
The heritage of centralisation established by the military is so
strong that as far back as 1986, the Nigerian political class had
accepted the idea of a strong President who will be relieved of
control by democratic institutions (Ibrahim, 1986). The British
parliamentary tradition has been completely replaced, not by the
American style presidential system that so many acclaimed, but by
the worst form of Jacobean dictatorship. Nigeria has certainly
not developed its own military Cincinnatus, it has created the
conditions for the rise of absolute dictators whose totalitarian
ambitions are very difficult to contain. It is this extreme
centralisation of power and corruption that created the
conditions for the exacerbation of ethno-religious conflicts and
checkmated the democratic transition in Nigeria.
It will be recalled that in 1985, another military coup d'Etat
once again came with the promise of handing over power to an
elected civilian administration in the country. The transition
programme was conducted under the aegis of General Ibrahim
Babangida who, like a voluntarist architect, drew a plan for a
complete transformation of the Nigerian body politic. His
programme covered a long transition period during which, a group
of political scientists drew up a programme of "political
crafting" that was supposed to create a new democratic political
culture.(2) General Babangida was indeed like an experienced
trapeze artist determined to use his political skills to complete
the patrimonialisation of Nigeria's political culture to ensure
that only rapacious political entrepreneurs that have looted the
nation's wealth and have no commitment to the people's welfare,
have the slightest chance of ever coming to power. The method he
used involved an elaborate process of political engineering in
^
2) The three major Professors of Political Science that
"crafted" Babangida's diabolical democratic transition that
never was, have recently published a book of self
justification - T. Olagunju, A Jinadu and S. Oyovbaire
Transitipn to Democracy in Nigeria: 1985-1993r Safari Books,
ibadan, 1993.
which the popular forces were successively excluded from the
transition programme through arbitrary and ever-changing rules
and corruption was entrenched as the only instrument for the
acquisition of political power.
The first element of the process was the systematic
destabilisation of the country's political class beginning with
the ban of "old" politicians in September 1987. The totality of
those who had held political office in all proceeding civilian
and military regimes were prohibited from participating in the
political transition process. A new breed of "grassroot
politicians" were to be created and they were to operate, not in
a multi-party framework but in two new political parties
registered by the State.
To determine the two political parties to be registered, the
National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the government imposed
very expensive and virtually impossible preconditions that only
the upper section of the bourgeoisie or old politicians with
established networks could have afforded or met. In three months,
the parties were to establish well equipped offices with at least
three paid staff in all the 435 local government areas in the
country. In addition, they were to supply 25 membership lists of
their parties comprising the names, photographs and personal
details of at least 200 members from each local government in the
country (making at least 87,000 individual membership files per
party) to the NBC. For good measure, prospective parties were to
6ubmit their applications with a registration fee of 50,000
naira. In spite of these draconian measures, 13 parties were able
to submit their files before the deadline.(3) In a broadcast to
the nation on 6th October 1989, the Head of State in a perfect
Catch 22 scenario used the argument that the "impossible"
preconditions had not been perfectly adhered to as a
justification to refuse to register any of the parties. The
political parties, he said, had:
Failed to comply with key conditions in the
guidelines such as documentation on members,
declaration of assets and liabilities of individual
members of the national executive committees [. . . ]
most of them (parties) had operated underground
prior to the lifting of the ban on politics on 3rd
May .1989 (...) (and) had deep roots in the party
politics of the First and Second Republics. There
(3) It was political farce at its worst. Nigeria run out of
photographic materials and Polaroid films in the stampede to
produce photographs of their members and emergency imports
had to be made and people were paid to have their
photographs taken etc. The parties had to hire lorries to
carry hundreds of thousands of the hurriedly prepared
membership files to NEC.
were very strong indications of the wealthy;
 r• , .
individuals in the executive committees of the
assbciations that confirm fears that they were being
1
 hijacked by money bags.. ..
As if any mass party in the world could give exact and detailed
information on all its members at any point in time or as if
politics could suddenly be cut of from historical connections to
past leaders, networks and isBues or that people with money could
or should be barred from the politics of liberal democracy.
Be that as it may, the government decided to dissolve all the
thirteen parties and create two new ones, allegedly for the
"ordinary people" at the grassroots - the Social Democratic Party
and the National Republican Convention, with the former leaning
"a little to the left of centre" and the latter leaning "a little
to the right of the centre". In addition, the government drew up
the manifestoes of the two parties, and decided to fund and staff
them, before calling on individuals (as opposed to organised
groups) to sign up. As Anthony Bnahoro said,
My judgement of the -two bodies is that they are
military government parastatals being paraded as
political parties for the benefit of the outside
world [... ] Nigeria is probably the only country
where people scamper from one king (or traditional
ruler) to another begging for or in any case
acquiring chieftaincy titles, and yet call
themselves "Republicans", and the one notable
country where people without a social conscience and
people whose sole qualification for high public
office is that they have successfully robbed the
public treasury, have the temerity to put themselves
: forward for public acceptance as social democrats.
(1992:5-6)
It is clear from the transition programme that the military
government has decided to define and apply each "democratic"
step on behalf of the people.
Apart from imposing manifestoes and constitutions on the two
parties, excessive powers were given to government-appointed
Administrative Secretaries to organise their take-off and to
EXCLUDE undue radicals, socialists, anti-Structural Adjustment
Programme agitators as well as ideological and religious
extremists from them. In addition, Decree 46 of 1991 gave the
National Electoral Commission (NEC), established by the Military
Government, wide ranging powers to disqualify any political
aspirant, whose action was "likely to disrupt the process of
grassroots democracy" and the law waB amended with Decree 6 of
1992 which widened these powers by absolving NEC of the duty of
explaining or giving reasons for disqualification. This law
enabled NBC Co disqualify thirty-two aspirants who had already
won their party's nominations for the Senatorial and House of
Assembly elections in July 1992. The threat of the NEC axe was
used to scare away many presidential candidates that were not
close friends of the military hierarchy.
The most dramatic aspect of the transition was however the
commercialisation of the nomination and electoral process through
the use, or rather abuse of the open ballot or queueing system in
which the secret ballot was disallowed and voters queued up in
public behind the party symbol of their "choice". The direct
effect of the system was that candidates pay people to vote for
them and party aides could directly observe and ensure that
people who have been "bought" joined the queue of the aspirant
who has paid for their vote. Not surprisingly, the state
Governors that were elected in 1991 were considered the most
corrupt and notorious elements in the nouveaux riches and
included a well known cocaine dealer and somebody who had been
found guilty by a Judicial Tribunal of bankrupting a State owned
National Supply Company he was managing by stealing its
resources. They were political entrepreneurs who had decided to
invest in the political game to make more money. It has been
estimated for example that no serious presidential candidate
spent less than fifty million naira ($2.5 million) for his
campaigns in 1992.(4)
The first set of leading Presidential candidates for the two
parties were disqualified by NEC for using money rather than
ideals in their campaigns. At that time, the handover date to an
elected Administration had been postponed from October 1990 to
October 1992 and then to August 1993 while Babangida and his
political science gurus "crafted" the newbreed politician. In a
last ditch attempt to get the General to hand over power, the two
parties nominated close personal fronds and business associates
of Babangida as their presidential candidates - Abiola for the
SDP and Tofa for the NRC and after a lot of procrastination by
government and determined protest against another postponement by
the people, presidential elections were finally held on 12th June
1993. The candidate of the ?DP won neatly in an election that was
generally considered free and fair. The elections were above all
a referendum in which Nigerians voted OUT Babangida, but he would
not take NO for an answer. He cancelled the elections and tried
to initiate yet another round of "political crafting" but there
was so much mass protests against the cancellation that he had to
leave power in haste and handover to an incompetent and powerless
civilian without any mandate, creating the basis for yet another
<4) For some detailed examples of the types and scale of the
expenses incurred, see "The Money Game", African Concordf 21
September 1992.
coup d'Etat in November 1993 by hie crafty second in command,
General Abacha. Abacha is now calling for a Constitutional
Conference in June 1994 to plan a "proper" democratic transition
- ten years, of transition planning by military overlords.
This process of political engineering has therefore further
eroded some of the elements of Nigeria's democratic traditions,
in particular,, the regional autonomy, that is ^ guaranteed by




 ;-of »res^ sfeing ;unfair
policies have ajl received a thorough beating. Patrimonialism and
th^! struggle gbr access to the State have imposed! a logic of
"political banditry in which thuggery,' bribery and political
assassination are becoming the core of the nation's political
...culture.,.,.. , .., ,,, ....... ... • .„.:? ;-3?.i> nr,; : w ; .;U .>;-..
AUTHSjiTARIANISM, PLURALISM AND THE RELIGIOUS ARENA n t
Religious movements constitute one of the most important types of
social movements in the contemporary era.,,They, o££.en provide an
arena to which popular classes that have been .pushed out of -other
political and social spaces could retreat in to. Nonetheless,
social scientists have been slow and sometimes reluctant' to take
them seriously, until the movements themselves impose their logic
oh society, and subsequently on the community of scholars:
1
 Religious activism intrudes upon the post-
;; enlightenment secular world of : sociological ^
theorising ."' as.., rudely, and with; :"i as little
comprehension, as secularism once intruded upon a
world1 united, by,belief. One of the paradoxes of the
modern, sciences- that have made much of our world1 more
.accessible to human intellect is that it has made
'this part less so (Fields, 1982:335) '
Functioniiislfc, sociology has found it difficult to fully
comprehend religious movements because of its attempts to reduce
them1'either to their expressive and symbolic or theix
instrumental and/or purposeful acts (Fields, 1982:326).
Similarly, Marxist sociology has tended to follow its founders in
reducing religious fervour to material conditions: '.:• )••;•
Religious distress is at the same time the expression
j^f r6al distress and the protest against real
'distress. It is the opium of the masses* (Marx,
•'•• ";• 1 9 6 4 : ; i 4 : 2 ) : ; ; " • •• •
! • •
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The claBS struggles of the day were carried on under
religious shibboleths (Engels, 1964:98)
It is difficult to disagree with Robert Wutbnow's (1991)
assertion that a review of recent social science literature and
theory reveals a clear failure to understand the complex
relationship between religion and politics. The, result is that
the complex, multi-facet relationship between religious ideology,
social relations and economic life is often oversimplified and
consequently misunderstood. ,-. .
Christian Coulon (1991) has argued convincingly that the dynamics
of religious movements in contemporary Nigeria is very complex
and cannot be reduced to a simple "revivalist movement" or a
mechanical response to political and economic crisis. It is thus
necessary to study more seriously, the current conjuncture of the
multiplication of religious movements in the country and the
intensification of their fervour not only in the context of
serious economic and social crisis but also the conditions
created by the so called programme of transition to democratic
rule, and the attempt by common people to produce autonomous
spheres of meaning and action. In so doing, it may be possible to.
elucidate the interface between growing and wide ranging
struggles for democratisation, and the multiplication of
religious movements and the intensification of their activities.
The African people have shown a high capacity to re-appropriate
and transform foreign ideologies and religions so that they fit
into their reality and their needs. It has.been argued by Mbembe
(1986) for example that Christianity, far from being the weapon
of the colonial aggressor in Africa, had been domesticated, re-
appropriated and turned into the secret weapon of the African
common man, (common person, in politically correct terminology).
He argues that political domination did not lead to spiritual
domination, it simply ignited the necessity for innovation.
Christianity, the religion of the conqueror, was accepted as a
strong new element to re-enforce indigenous "Paganism" in the
African tradition of using all forces to combat objective
problems of survival.
The importance of religious movements in African society is
linked to their capacity for providing "democratic space" for
surbordinated actors - the colonised against the colonisers, the
poor against the rich, African rulers against their citizens or
rather, their subjects.(5) Numerous groups that have been
marginalised by the colonial or postcolonial State, such as women
activists, poorly educated or uneducated youth and members of
5) For the notion of "democratic space", see our paper and
research project; "The Expansion of Nigerian Democratic
Space" CODESRIA National Working Qroup, 1991.
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casted groups have been able to participate actively in social
life through the religious arena. (6) It is an arena in which
access is difficult to block. This factor is important since
official religions, both Christian and Islamic have been
increasingly unable to secure the adherence of the "masses1* and
have lost a considerable number of their members to protesting
sects representing more popular versions of the religion.
One of the crucial sectors in which the State, Official Religion
and secular ideologies have been unable to provide adequate
response, at least in practice, is that of poverty and
relationship to property. It has been argued by Rasmessen that
both Islam and Christianity have the same doctrinal approach to
property:
Since all property belongs to God, it must be
administered to the benefit of the community as a
whole... Therefore one should not accumulate wealth
for one's own benefit by exploiting others, but
rather burden oneself in order to bring relief for
others, instead of accumulating, one should share.
Both the Qur'an and Bible contain a radical critique
of wealth. (Rasmussen, 1990:94)
Pew, and increasingly fewer religious leaders, and the rich and
powerful people they support, live up to the solidarity
requirements of their faiths. In other words, just like
communism, official religion is confronted with the problem of
resolving human needs in conformity with its creed and forced to
pay the price of its perceived failure. At this time when a lot
of interest is being expressed in the "religious" forms and
dimensions of communist ideology, some interest should also be
focused on how world religions have failed, or are failing in
their ideological mission.
The informal sector has been asserting itself as a major and open
sector of creative production and survival in Africa. A lot of
people are being marginalised from the official and mainstream
economy, and pushed to the informal sector. Religion could be
conceived as the ideology of this informal sector. It is
characterised by open access and multiple possibilities to a wide
spectrum of actors that enter the arena and each actor that gets
involved re-interprets it in the context of his or her own target
community, often ignoring the dictates of official religion. The
presence of numerous actors in the- context of open access cannot
but breed a Crisis-generating mechanism
6) See for example Ruth Marshall's interesting approach in using
the "Bordeaux School's" - "Le politique par le bas" in the
analysis of power, social transformation and pentecostalism
in Western Nigeria.
Pluralism and religious conflict have become a major theme in
Nigeria's political development. The two universal religions,
Islam and Christianity are both internally divided and they
relate in a complex and variable geometry with other elements of
plural society such as traditional African religions, ethnicity,
regionalism and statism. The fact that the two main religions
have sacred texts that are accepted by virtually all sects and
groups has not prevented the. growth of serious conflicts caused
by different theological interpretations. Nonetheless, factional
and sectarian differences and struggles linked to ideological,
political and leadership variables seem to play a more important
role than theological differences. There is also the relatively
new tendency of large scale "ecumenical struggles" by Christians
and Muslims acting as organised blocs (Ibrahim, 1989).
What is significant is that the two universal religions are based
on ideological orientations that aim at uniting the whole of
humanity, but paradoxically, their evolution as social movements
seems to impose a splinter logic on them. In an incisive analysis
of Islam and pluralism in 18th and 19th century Northern
Nigeria, Mahmoud Tukur argues that the Shariah, the Muslim holy
text, is sufficiently broad to support divergent views; "whatever
political views one holds today, one can, if one knows where to
look for, find support in the Shariah." Tukur adds however that
the necessity to differ and the necessity to quarrel lies not so
much in the sacred texts themselves but in the concrete socio-
political situation of the epoch and of the Nation (1990:19). The
works of Umar, Doi, Bako, Coulon, Kane etc reveal different
aspects of contemporary Islamic sectarianism.
In Christianity, the work of Bishop Akerele (1986) has made a
major contribution to the arduous task of analysing
denominational sectarianism and separatism in the Nigerian
Church. Omoyajowo's (1984) study of schisms and factionalism in
the history of the Cherubin and Seraphim movement is a classic of
the genre. Other studies by Peel, Ojo, Hackett, Kalu, etc have
focused on more specific aspects of Christian pluralism. At the
more general level, the Nigerian Association for the Study of
Religions and the Nigeria^ Association for Religious Tolerance
have edited a number of relevant studies.
The development of both Islam and Christianity in Nigeria has
depended on their capacities to convert believers in traditional
religions. In the 1931 census, 50% of the population were
registered as "pagans" with the percentage declining to 34% in
1952 and 18.2% in 1963; leaving Islam with 47% and Christianity
with 34% of the population. Almost nobody is registered today as
a pagan and as the 1991 census did not pose the question of
religious affiliation, it is not known which of the two religions
gained a majority of the rest of the "pagans". The study by
Qilliland (1986) shows that traditional religions have faded away
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as official identities but they still dominate the lives of a
substantial number of Nigerians who are syneretists in practice.
Conversion campaigns in "pagan communities" have been one of the
major activities of Christian and Islamic evangelisation
campaigns.
One of the major objects of Colonial Rule was the conversion of
"pagans" to Christianity. After independence, the Sardauna of
Sokoto initiated a major Islamic conversion campaign among
"pagan" groups of Northern Nigeria from 1963. Since the mid
1970s, evangelical sections of the two religious groups have
focused their attention on the "last remnants" of the pagans.
Conversion is a major crisis-generating factor in contemporary
Nigeria. Conversion, a Godly and positive achievement for the
receiving group is apostasy, an evil act for the losing one.
Worse, converts are praudly and loudly shown around in the media,
in mass congregations etc; almost as if they were war booty, an
act that breeds more triomphalism on one side and bitterness on
the other. In addition, conversion campaigns and methods such as
attempts to debunk the validity of the sacred texts of the other
group or mass meetings in the "territory" of the other side have
ignited a lot of the current religious uprisings in the country.
The 1987 crisis in Kafanchan was the first in a tragic series of
"territorial" conflicts that would mark a turn for the worse in
inter-community relations in the country.
THE HIDDEN AGENDA AND KTHNO-RELIGIOUS MOBILISATION
Nigeria has witnessed a surge in the phenomenon of Christian and
Islamic religious fundamentalism or revivalism since the mid
1970'B (Ibrahim, 1989 and 1991). Islamic fundamentalism involves
a frontal attack against remnants of traditional African
religious practices still prevalent among Muslim communities, and
secondly, it involves a struggle against mystical practices and
the beliefs of Sufi brotherhoods, mainly the Tijaniyya and the
Qadiriyya. Christian fundamentalism, organised under the rubric
of the "Born Again" movement, involves a struggle against what it
considers to be the corrupt Nigerian Church whose spirituality
has been destroyed by "pagan practices", materialism and
hierarchical structures. There has also been a steadily rising
conflict between Muslim and Christian actors acting as organised
blocs. Muslim actors have created a linkage between the Nigerian
secular State and Christianity and thus reject the State as it
is, while demanding the establishment of an Islamic State based
on the Shari'a.
Since 1978 therefore, the Shari'a has become a major bone of
contention in Nigerian politics. The debates during the 1978
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Constituent Assembly revolved a lot around the issue of the
Shari'a (Laitin, 1982). One of the major issues arising from that
period was that many Yoruba members of the Constituent Assembly
did not join their Northern colleagues in the Shari'a political
quarrel:
Yorubas were not recruited by agents of either side
to further polarise Nigeria on the religious
dimension. Furthermore, they took compromise
positions gratuitously, talcing no political advantage
o£ their insouciance on the issue." (Laitin, 1986:10)
This has since changed, and in 1988, Yoruba leaders have played a
key role in the battles over provisions for a Shariah Court of
Appeal in the Constituent Assembly - see Aniagolu (1993:93-147).
Being one of the major arenas for the reproduction of popular
ideological discourses and struggles, the religious scene has
witnesses a runaway inflation in the production of clergy and a
growing battle for the control of "theological space". In order
to survive, the growing number of Pastors, Mallama, Sheiks,
Reverends, Imams and Prophets try to demonstrate that their
competitors are heterodoxical in their religious beliefs and
practices. The "fundamentalists" try to separate themselves from
the others and "puritans" combat the cultural reality of the
existence of multiple sources of divinity. The turbulence of the
religious scene therefore fuels the associated agitation in the
political arena especially in the context of growing fears over
political domination and religious freedom.
Muslim activists express concern and fears over what they
consider to be the dominance of Christian culture in Nigeria
established by the colonial experience. The major concerns are
about the nature of the State, especially its secular tradition
and its juridical common law framework. The contention is that as
Muslims, the separation of the sacred and the mundane is
unacceptable and the legal framework that governs their lives
should be the Shari'a. Other issues raised include, the tradition
of having Saturday and Sunday as workfree days while the Islamic
holy day, Friday, is a normal working day, the use of - the
Gregorian Christian calender for official business, unlelamic
uniforms for girls in schools, Christian melody in the National
Anthem, the Christian cross as the symbol for health institutions
etc.
Christian activists are concerned mainly with what they regard as
the threat of the Islamisation of the country and the imposition
of the Shari'a on non Muslims. They argue that the Shari'a has
been used to oppress Christians in Muslim dominant parts of
Northern Nigeria. Linked to this concern is the tradition of
Muslim political hegemony in the country and in the army. They
are worried that moBt regimes in the country's post independence
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history have been dominated and led by Northern Muslim
politicians or military officers. Other concerns are the use of
State resources to subsidise Islamic activities, in particular,
the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and the government take-over of
missionary schools, most of which belonged to Christian
denominations.
The idiom of a HIDDEN AGENDA has played a major role in creating
the conditions in which religious pluralism made an explosive
pact with ethnicity since General Babangida's transition
programme to the Third Republic started. Christian circles had
been concerned with the dominance of Muslim officers in ruling
bodies ever since the Buhari coup d'Btat of January 1994:
The Buhari regime's highest policy-making and
legislative organ, the Supreme Military Council
(SMC), was heavily criticised for being dominated
not only by Northerners but also by Muslim .
military officers. The same lopsidedness was
reflected in the Armed Forces Ruling Council
(AFRO, the SMC a equivalent under the Babangida
Administration. (Agbaje, 1990:303)
Even the change of nomenclature by Babangida from SMC to AFRC was
interpreted to be part of an Islamic agenda with the argument
that Islam does not allow for a supreme council as only Allah is
supreme.
Secondly, the Babangida regime in particular was, and was seen as
a crafty regime whose promises and official programmes were a
facade and a ruse that hid its real intentions of monopolising
political power and perpetuating it in its hands. The numerous
broken promises to hand over power to an elected government
fuelled this belief. It was however the style of government that
was the most alarming issue. As a Civil Liberties Organisation
study argued, the country had a dictator:
The powers he (Babangida) concentrated in his
office were uniquely total and unchecked,
amounting to all intents and purposes, to powers
ordinarily exercised by a one man dictator
(1993:16)
The first issue on which Nigerians realised that for the first
time in their country's history, they were dealing with a
dictator was a religious one. It was about the country joining
the Islamic Conference Organisation (OIC), an organisation
established in 1969 to unify the Muslim Umma all over the world
and mould them into a political and economic force. Observer
delegations from Nigeria had been attending OIC meetings since
its formation.. In January 1986, secret negotiations were carried
out that led to the country officially but surreptitiously
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joining the OIC. The newspapers found out and reported the story
but the then deputy to General Babangida, Commodore Bbitu Ukiwe
declared that "the stories about Nigeria's membership were a
figment of journalistic imagination* (Ahanotu, 1992:29). It
turned out that an official delegation under Rilwan iiUkman, the
petroleum minister was sent to join the organisation without
discussing it with the ARFC or the Council of Ministers and
neither Babangida's deputy nor the foreign minister, Bolaji
Akinyemi were in the know. Both of them were later dropped from
the Government:
The pattern of selection and dismissals of
President Babangida's Cabinet Ministers caused
alarm to Christians. The dismissals of Commodore
Ebitu Ukiwe from his position as Chief of General
staff, Professor Tarn David West from his Petroleum
Cabinet post and Lt General Domkat Bali from his
position as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Defence Minister. (Ahanotu, 1992:31)
Nigerians realised with alarm that constituted government bodies
had been made irrelevant for the first time in the history of
military rule and that the dictator seemed to believe he could do
as he pleased. That was how fears about a hidden agenda by
President Babangida started to take root. Christians were
concerned that he might take .drastic decisions on religious
matters that might affect them negatively while all democrats
were worried about the growing authoritarian tendencies of the
regime. In the same year, 1986, a magazine editor Dele Oiwa, who
was said to be trying to publish an embarrassing story on
President Babangida was killed, by a parcel bomb by elements
apparently linked to military intelligence. It was the first case
of assassination in the 130 years of Nigerian journalism.
Fears about religious, regional and ethnic domination did not
start with the Babangida regime. In fact, hateful memories have
been building up in many communities over the years. Northern
Muslims were for example seriously grieved by the assassinations
of January 1966, especially that of the Northern Premier, the
Sardauna of Sokoto. In the words of the late Muslim cleric, Gumi:
It was immediately apparent that the Igbo
Christian officers were the leaders and all the
killings followed a set pattern. Only the Muslims
and those who were considered as their friends
were assassinated. (1992:1177)
The Sardauna, it would be recalled had embarked on a massive
Islamisation campaign in the early 1960's and was said to have
had the ambition of "dipping the Qur'an in to the sea":
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With the death of the Sardauna the Christians Celt
that God had somehow used the tribalistic factors
of the arm/ to rid them of a fearful element. The
Sardauna was feared because he was using the
classic model of an Islamic state to align
Christians with his party against their will.
(Gilliland, 1986:183)
The July 1966 revenge massacre of mainly Igbo Christians in
Northern Nigeria closed the cycle that led to the three year
civil war. In the 1970's, the assassination of the Head of State,
general Hurtala Mohammed by mainly Christian officers from the
Middle Belt and the purges and execution of officers from that
area kept up the tempo Of the accumulation of hate memories. A
tendency that was accelerated under Babangida following the two
attempted coup d'Btats against him and the numerous execution of
army officers he carried out. The real legacy of the Babangida
regime was to create the impression in the minds of Nigerians
that the time has come when the worst fears in their hate memory
could be realised by the all powerful Presidency.
we have argued that the transition process was geared towards
excluding an increasingly larger number of political actors from
the political process and the result was that the religious arena
became one of the few in which a great number of actors could
participate and protest against their exclusion and their fears.
The combination of political exclusion, the hardship imposed by
the financial crisis of the rentier State and ethnic and
religious pluralism combined to provoke a series of ethno-
religious crises. As is often the case in popular struggles
however, the enemies that are sought for were not the political
leaders who have the responsibilities of steering the country's
political affairs, but the neighbour next door that seems to be
different.
RELIGION AND COMMUNAL CONFLICTS
Since the 1980s, a number of bloody conflicts with a specific
ethno-religious character have afflicted Northern Nigeria - 1980
in Kasuwan Magani, 1984 in Zangon Kataf and Gure-Kahugu, 1987 in
Kafanchan and Lere, 1989 in Ilorin and Jere, 1991 in Tafawa
Balewa, 1992 in Zango Kataf etc. The main protagonists are
Hausa/Pulani Muslims and Christian Ethnic Minorities from the
"pagan" areas the former used for their slave raiding activities
in the past. It should be noted that the "pagan" groups that had
been converted to Islam had mostly, been ethnically converted to
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the Hausa/Fulani group.(7) the "pagan question" seems to play an
important role in creating a climate of suspicion and
intolerance. In the 1950s, many representatives of the ethnic
minorities complained before the Willinks Commission that the
Hausa/Fulani were contemptious of them and called them "arna",
meaning pagan or infidel.(8) These groups were worried about the
implications of Independence because during the colonial period:
•'The British embarked on a policy of imposing "alien"
Moslem district heads on communities that had never
been conquered and incorporated into the Sokoto
Caliphate." (Mahadi and Mangvat, 1986:38)
There is thus a latent feeling of unfair domination among the
groups that believe "alien Muslim rulers" have been imposed upon
them. In the pre-independence period, these groups formed the
Northern Nigeria Non Muslim League which later metamorphosised
into a party - United Middle Belt Congress; an instrument
conceived to counter the Northern People's Congress, the party of
the Hausa/Fulani majority. Over the past few decades, the Elites
from these minority groups have been' exposed to western
education, have risen to the top of the army hierarchy and public
service and have made money and are becoming more and more
belligerent and as intolerant as those they are struggling
against. The result has been a multiplication of confrontations
in a context in which the religious idiom has been politicised to
such. an extent that the stake has become the survival of the
Nigerian State.
A) KAFANCHAN
The first, in the current series of ethno-religious crises
started tn Kafanchan in March 1987. A quarrel erupted between
Christian and Muslim students during a Christian evangelical
campaign at the Kafanchan College of Education.(9) The crisis was
ignited by allegations that a convert from Islam to Christianity,
Abubakar Bako, had misinterpreted the Holy Qur'an while
7) See for example the conversion of Maguzawa to Hausa (Last,
1979) or that of Qungawa to Hausa analysed by Salamone
(1976).
8) The willinks commission was established by the British
Authorities to look at the fears of ethnic minorities before
independence. The complaint about the name calling "arna"
- '. recurs in the reports of the numerous conntissions of inquiry
that have investigated the various ethno-religious crises.
9) see our article, (Ibrahim, 1989) for a detailed political
analysis of this crisis.
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preaching. This led to a Eight between Christian and Muslim
students on the Campus. The fight spread to Kafanchan town which
is populated by Christian ethnic minorities of southern Kaduna,
the indigenous local majority and Muslim Hausa/Pulani settlers.
The Christian majority descended on the Muslim minority, twelve
of whom were killed. The conflagration spread from Kafanchan to
six other towns in Kaduna state - Katsina, Funtua, Zaria, Kankia,
Daura and Kaduna in which the Muslim communities made reprisal
raids on Christian settlers, 19 of whom were killed. There was
also destruction of Churches, Mosques, beer parlours etc.
According to the late Muslim cleric, Gumi:
The Kafanchan crisis was the first mass action
against Muslims in the country since the military
coup of 1966... Among others, Christian regional
forces in the Southern part of the country have
joined house with minority Christian groups in the
North to campaign against all Muslim interests
especially in the Northern States. (1992:191)
with the Kafanchan crisis, fear started spreading especially
among minority communities in Northern Nigeria and the spiral of
conflicts waB set in motion.
B) TAFAHA BALEWA
In April 1991 in Tafawa Balewa, a quarrel in the market between a
Christian Zar(lO) butcher and some Hausa/Fulani people led to the
massacre of Muslims in the town. The corpses were taken from
Tafawa Balewa to Bauchi town and the sight provoked revenge
massacre of the Zar people and other Christian settlers in the
town. The army was called in to make the peace but it seemed most
of the soldiers, were Christians and they turned their guns on
Muslims leading to a serieB of massacres in. which thousands of
people were alleged to have been killed.
C) THE JUKUNS AND THEIR THREE MAR FRONTS
Over the past three years, the JUkun people of Taraba State have
been involved in three ethnic and/or religious confrontations
10) The Zar, called Sayawa by the Hausa, are an ethnic minority
in Bauchi state but the majority in Tafawa Balewa. Some of
them converted into Islam and were absorbed by the
Hausa/Fulani community but a majority seemed to have
converted to Christianity.
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with their neighbours. The first front which was opened in 1990'
is a classic quarrel over land between the Jukuns and the Tivs.
The Tivs are a land pressed fanning group, that have been
spreading into Jukun territory over the past one or so centuries.
There has been skirmishes between the two groups for a long time
and a major confrontation started in 1990 when the Tivs sided
with other local minorities to turn the Jukuns into a minority in
wukari, an area they considered theirs. Since then, there has
been a virtual civil war in the area, with both sides using
soldiers and ex servicemen from their areas, well armed with
stolen army weapons. The second front is the classic
confrontation between the Jukuns as a Christian ethnic minority
confronting Hausa/Fulani Muslims in 1991. There was a recurrence
of this in March 1992 when a quarrel between Christian and Muslim
Students in Government secondary School, jalingo, in which a
student was killed led to a major confrontation in the town
between Jukun and Murauye Christians and Hausa/Fulani Muslims. The
third front is between three groups that are all indigenous to
the area. It involved an alliance between the Jukuns and the
Chambas against the Kuteb, at least 50 of whom were killed in May
1992. The occasion was the Kuteb Kuchieheb festival which their
local rivals - the Chambas and the Jukuns saw aB a sign of Kuteb
ascendency and a challenge to local Jukun hegemony. The Jukuns
were particularly incensed that the Kuteb controlled the Takum
chieftaincy and Local Government Authority.
D) ZANGO KATAF
in Zango Kataf, as in Kafanchan, there is a Muslim minority
Hausa/Fulani community living in a Zango, (a Hausa enclave),
since the 17th century, amongst a Christian Kataf (Atyab)
population. The Hausa community in the Zango controlled the
market in this old market town and the Kataf community, which
considered itself the "real indigenes", were becoming
increasingly angry about the control of the market and the
control of territorial administration by the Emir of Zaria. in
January 1992, the Kataf controlled Local Government Council
decreed that the market would be moved out of Zango on the 6th of
February. On the same day, the Zango community was attacked by
the Kataf and many were killed. A Commission of Enquiry was
established but before its findings were released, the Kataf
community again attacked the Muslim community on 15th May and
hundreds of people were killed. As was the case with the Tafawa
Balewa. episode, corpses of slain Muslims were taken to Kaduna
town and the sight inflamed the Muslim community into revenge
killing. In Kaduna town and also in Zaria, both coimtunitiee
engaged in an orgy of revenge killings in parts of the town where
they were a majority and thousands of people were killed.
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A number of common features could be observed from these
conflicts. All of them involve problems of perceived political
domination by a group considered as external or illegitimate -
they are all over the control over land and political power, see
Bonat (1993). There is a steady rise in the death toll, from a
few persons, to dozens, hundreds and now even thousands. The rise
in the death toll is partly due to the participation of serving
military personnel and/or ex-servicemen. Cultural and religious
differences have been evoked to explain these bloody clashes. The
Cudjoe commission that was examining the zangon Kataf clashes has
been told for example that:
"The largely Christian Kataf told the Cudjoe panel
that the Hausa refer to them as "arna", which means
non-Muslims, but is deeply resented by the Kataf. Por
their part, the Hausa told the panel they deeply
resented sale and consumption of both pork and
burukutu, a native beer." (Citizen, is/6/1992)
These differences do not explain anything because the communities
have been living together for centuries and the current level of
hatred and violence had never been attained previously. What is
clear is that the relative autnomy of the religious arena and its
dynamism maintained by a large horde of "religious entrepireenurs"
makes for easy production and spread of violent conflicts,
CONCLUDING REMARKS
flft AMD THBj MfoRCM. TOWARDS THB THIRD REPUBLIC
There Is a major problem over the control anrt nan, or rather.
m^fluae of powpt^ in Nigeria. The grQui-on pf Nictgria1!! federalist
i^rfldiitiionB is at the centre pf tihft problem. Thft Constitutional
provision of federal character which was created to reduce ethno-
religious and regional tensions has had mixed results. In
principle, federal character is supposed to act as a veritable
machine for creating a national political class. The 1979
Constitution integrated some dispositions concerning this
"federal character" into Nigeria's public law. The provisions
require that there should be national spread in the distribution
of political and senior administrative posts. The measures which
are similar to the Soviet doctrine of "principle of equilibrium",
aim at establishing an equilibrium of numerical correlation
between the federated states in Nigeria and the political and
administrative elite. The Soviet doctrine failed to work because
there was neither equilibrium nor the means to protest against
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the lack of equilibrium between dominant Russia and the other
Republics in the Federation thus leading to the break-up of the
Soviet State. Nigeria seems to be following the same trajectory.
There is a political problem regarding the definition of
indegeneity which affects citizenship rights in the country. In
practice, indegenes are defined on the basis of the place of
origin Of fathers and although there is a procedure for the
naturalisation of aliens, there is none for the indigenisation of
citizens in places other than the places of origin of their
fathers. .There are policies that discriminate against non
indigenes in all local governments and in all states in the
country on issues such as educational opportunities for their
children, access to health care, land, jobs etc in which non
indigenes, including those whose mothers are from the area are
considered outsiders. The effect is that generational longevity
in a settlement cannot guarantee full assimilation so settlers
are forced to return to their homelands to buy land, educate
their children etc.
A second problem is generated directly by the principl
federal character itself. It has been used as a justificatio
ale of
n for
the application of affirmative action policies that are aimed at
balancing recruitment into the higher echelons of the public
service. Historically, the Nigerian public service has been
dominated by Southerners who have had more access to western
education, with federal character, relatively easy access to the
upper hierarchies of the civil service and public corporations
has been opened to Northerners, and this has generated complaints
about discrimination from many Southerners. There are very strong
feelings about a northern based oligarchy that has monopolised
political power in the country:
There is a need to diffuse regional resentment of
the continuing use of the "federal character"
principle to promote affirmative action in
education and the bureaucracy. Nigeria's
affirmative action policies are designed mainly to
benefit not a weak minority, but the politically
dominant, if educationally disadvantaged north.
(R. T. Suberu, 1993:52)
in the long term, the federal character measures might have
positive effects on the evolution of the political,
administrative and even economic elite in Nigeria. Since the 1979
Constitution, it has been difficult to systematically exclude
geographical, religious, ethnic or any other group from power,
in the last twenty years, federal political and administrative
posts have been distributed among all the States in the country,
in each State, all the Local Governments receive their quota of
posts, and in each of the Local Governments existing in the
country, each district has its percentage. It would appear that.
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today, the established doctrine of the State is that of "fair
geographical distribution of the spoils", if I may call it that.
In the 1960s, Isaac Boro and Joseph Tarka launched wars on the
Nigerian State because the C-O-R and Middle Belt regions were
almost totally excluded from all the benefits which could come
from the State. Today, these regions benefit not only from
patronage, administrative posts, contracts, etc., but also from
schools, industries, electricity, etc. to almost, but not quite
the same degree as the other regions in the country.
The principle of "fair geographical distribution of spoils" has
itself been turned into a generator of instability. Since 1979,
almost all the political and administrative elites in Nigeria
have been converted to the practice of applying distributive
arithmetic to the "federal character" principle and as soon as a
group - ethnic, religious, clan, local government, ward etc,
feels that it is slightly under-represented, it reacts. During
the Second Republic, the possibilities for negotiation which
existed in the political system were able to contain the
agitations but since the coup d'Btat of January 1984, more and
more violent and dramatic solutions (military putsches and
civilian uprisings) have been used. It would even appear that
another civil war is not to be ruled out. Indeed, on April 22,
1990, a group of army officers announced a coup d'Btat on the
Federal radio which proclaimed "a revolution" for the oppressed
people of the Middle Belt and Southern Nigeria and the excision
of five northern States (Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano, and
Bauchi) from Nigeria. They also called on.the Christians to rise
againBt oppression by the Muslims (Newswatch. 7/5/1990). It was a
real declaration of civil war and, luckily, the people saw it to
be just that and so the majority did not answer the call to rise..
The coup plotters were overpowered with difficulty and the event
showed, clearly the extent to which national unity remains very
fragile. ' ' '•'" ' ;."• :., .
The argument of this paper is that it. is not, the difference
between ethnic, cultural, religious groups that are important.
There are now a lot of bloody and brutal conflicts between small
groups- that are culturally and ethnically similar such as.,the
Ogonis and Andonis in Rivers State and the Jukuns and the Kutebs
in Taraba state. Ignatieff's interesting, study of nationalism,
blood and belonging in contemporary Europe draws upon Freudian
analysis to offer an insight into the nature of the problem:
Freud once argued that the smaller the real
difference between two peoples the larger it was
bound to loom in their imagination. He called this
effect the narcissism of minor difference. Its •
corollary must be that enemies need each other to
remind themselves of who they really are. A Croat,
thus is someone who is not a Serb. A Serb is
someone who is not a Croat... All Croats become
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Uetashe assassins; all Serbs become Chetnik
beasts. (1993:14-15)
Once fear combines with hate memory in a context in which
political authority is seen as illegitimate and partial,
senseless massacres are easily justified as the -fault of the
other. In Nigeria, the erosion of multiple poleei. of—political
power by military dictators has raised the spectre of the fear of
domination and the absence of the State as a neutral arbiter.
Conflict reeol'ut'iohmeChahiBms break down and political actors
take maximalist positions and acquire disdain for compromise.
• o r ; :'•<.$ ,':.<^"n-'i. ->'.' -'y'v • *•"-• . r < s « ' - ; '
The new element introduced by the Babangida regime was the rise
of a one man dictatorship and the fear of what he could,do..with
so'jmuch power. During1-the- First Republic, Ahmadu..j^eisb^i i the
leadeSTrjaf the ruling party;Wad not interested in federa!|' ppwer
anduchose to stay in-his region. In contemporary Nigeria, J.t^B
now,clear-that the only post worth fighting for, and for. which
people ihave'.to fight for is the presidency. The tragedy .bf^ ji; he
babangida regime was that at the beginning, it had a lot of
goodwill! because of its pledge to respect human rights; and to
promote • ethnic; and religious balance in appointments.
 y It
fulfilled neither, worse still, it evolved a transition programme
with ,two State sponsored political parties in which government
influence and. - money were the most important variables. When
President Babangida was forced to allow election to take place in
June 1993, three years later than promised, he ended up
confirming the worst fears of people by annulling the results of
the elections and giving the impression that he was not willing
to allow someone from! a different part of the country to take
over the mantle of leadership.
The June 12th 1993 presidential elections were cancelled mid way
through the announcement of the results just at the moment when
it had become clear that M. K. 0. Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim had won
a landslide victory. Even if the truth of the matter was that
Babangida was a dictator who wanted to rule for ever, why
shouldn't the Yorubas think it Was a Hausa/Fulani plot to keep
them out of power. The fact that both parties had Muslim
candidates was itself a big political problem as Christian
activists felt that they were being sidelined as usual. In
addition, jAbiola chose a Muslim running mate. Nonetheless, such
was the desire to see Babangida but of the pblitittal scene that
people downplayed the religious divide M d yot^d 'itias'^ yely; for
A§&QiaiCwhQ.,, appeared to;: toe less -of a Babangida •"'g.tjdtfge- than-,,. jjds
riv^ i,.-, Bashir Tofa. The electiiohiS'therWelve's''-were cdns,i"dfered
reiatiyelyr free and fair and ra good opportunity to start
rebuilding confidence in the Nigerian Nation. The cancellation
however led to strong, ethnic and regional fears that the Northern
ruling claps werei not going;to ailow"'a Southerner to rule, even
if he wins <a: jtenqcratic electibh."1"':
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The brouhaha over the annulled elections was such that President
Babangida was forced out of office by street protests and his own
military machine. He however set up a puppet regime under a
civilian nonentity, Ernest Shonekan before leaving office in
August 1993. The Shonekan Government could not generate respect
or authority and in November 1993, Babangida'B longest serving
Northern Muslim ally, General Sani Abacha carried out another
coup d'Btat and took over power. After ten years of deceitful
democratic transition, the new military regime has once again put
everything on the drawing board. A Constitutional Conference is,
to take place from June to December 1994 and a new transition
programme may be announced in January 1995. Military dictators
are really pushing Nigerians to the precipice...
Saving the Nigerian Nation will require not only a return to
civilian rule but also a decbncentration of the powers of the
central government through a genuine federal mechanism. More
power centres have to be created in the country. It is also
necessary to give up. the idea of "garrison" political parties
"crafted" by some gurus and allow all groups, so willing, to form
their own parties. As the struggles of Nigerians for a Third
Republic continues, the expansion of democratic space is the most
effective method of overcoming the FEAR of the dictator which the
masses often transform into the FEAR of the "other neighbour".
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABBESB, p. o. "Defence Expenditure and Private Capital
Accumulation in Nigeria" Journal of African and Asian
Studjea. vol XXIII (3-4), 1988.
ADEWALB, S. A. (ed) Christianity and Socio-political Order in
Nigeria, The Nigerian Association for Christian Studies,
Ibadan, 1987.
ADEWALB, S. A. (ed) Religion and State: The Nigerian Experience.
Orita Publications, Ibadan, 1988.
AFRICA LEADERSHIP FORUM, Religious Pluralism and Democracy.
Dialogue no. 19, December 1991.
26
AQBAJB, A "Travails of the Secular state: Religion, PoliticB and
the Outlook on Nigeria's Third Republic", The Journal of
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol XXVII, no 3,
1990.
AHANOTU, Austin "Muslims and Christians in Nigeria: A
Contemporary Political Discourse" in A. Ahanotu (ed)
Religion. Stata and Society in Contemporary Nigeria. Peter
Lang, New York, 1992.
ANIAGOLU, A. N. The. Making of the 19B9 Constitution of Nigeria.
Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 1993. . ...
AWA, E. "The Nigerian Political system : A Critical Assessment
of Twenty-five Years of Independence from Colonial Rude".
Studies in Politics and Snriety. n°A, October, 1985.
AYAGI, Ibrahim. The Trapped Krpnomy. Ibadan: Heinemann, 1990.
BANGURA, Yusuf, Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A
Theoretical Discourse", UNRISD Discussion Paper, Geneva,
1991.
BECKMAN, B. "The Post-Colonial State: Crisis and Reconstruction"
IDS Bulletin, no 19 (4) 1087.
BONAT, Z. A. "Political Change and Socioeconomic processes in the
Nigerian Middle Belt" Paper for ADB/CINERGIE workshop on
Population, Space and Development in Nigeria, Lagos, October
1993.
CALLAGHY, T. "Politics and vision in Africa" in P. Chabal,
Political domination in Africa. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1986.
CIVIL LIBERTIES ORGANISATION Human Rights in Retreat. Lagos,
1993.
COULON, Christian "Lea itineraires politiques de 1'Islam au
Nord Nigeria", forthcoming in Bayart J-F (ed) Les mediations
reliqieuses en Afrique Noi,re. Karthala, Paris, 1991.
CRAMTON, E. P; T. Christianity in Northern Nigeria. Zaria, 1975.
DOI, A. Islam in Nigeria. Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 1984.
DUIKIBWIEZ, P and WILLIAMS G. "All the Kings Horses and All the
Kings Men Couldn't put Humpty-Dumpty Together Again"
Bulletin, no 18, 1987.
27
EKBH, Peter "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A
Theoretical Statement", Comparative Studies in Society and
History, no 17; 1975.
EKBKWE, Erne Class and statg in Nigeria. Longman, London,
1986.
ENAHARO, Anthony, "Beyond the Transition", press conference,
Lagos, 26th March 1992.
FIELDS, M. "Charismatic Religion as Popular Protest: The Ordinary
and the Extra-ordinary in Social Movements" in Theory and
Society, vol 2, no 1, 1982.
GBABAMOSI, T. and AJAYI, J. "Islam and Christianity in Nigeria"
in Ikime, 0. (ed) Groundwork of M.iqe.r.i.ffn H'it!'t"nOrY- Heineman,
Ibadan, 1980.
GILLILAND, D. "First Conversion and Second Conversion in
Nigeria", Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol XXVI,
nos 2 - 4 , 1991.
GILLILAND, D. African Religion Meets Islam: Religious Change in
Northern Nigeria. University Press of America, Lanham, 1986.
GUMI, S. A. with TSIGA, S. A. Where i stand, spectrum Books,
Ibadan, 1992
HACKETT, R. Religion in Calahar: The Religious Life and History
of a Nigerian Town. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, 1989.
IBRAHIM Jibrin "Politics and Religion in Nigeria: The Parametres
of the 1987 crisis in Kaduna State" Review of African
Political Economy, no. 45/46, 1989.
IBRAHIM Jibrin "The Expansion of Nigerian Democratic Space"
CODBSRIA National Working Group Discusion Paper, Dakar,
1991.
IBRAHIM Jibrin "The Transition to Civil Rule: Sapping Democracy
in Nigeria" in A Olukoshi (ed) The Politic* of Structural
Ad-juHtment in Nigeria. James Currey, London, 1993.
IBRAHIM, Jjjjrjjj "Religion and Political Turbulence in Nigeria"
Journal of Modern African Studies, no. 29(1), 1991.
IBRAHIM, Jibxia "Succession politique et crispation sociale au
Nigeria: 1987-1988", Ann£e Africaina (1987-1988)• Pedone,
Bordeaux, 1990. .••
28
IBRAHIM, Jibrin "The Political Debate and the Struggle for
Democracy in Nigeria", The Review of African Political
Economy, no.37, 1986.
IBRAHIM, Jibrin. "The State, Accumulation and Democratic Forces
in Nigeria" in Lars Rudebeck (ed) when Democracy Makes
Sense; Studies in the Democratic potential of Third World
Popular Movements. AKUT, Uppsala, 1992.
IBRAHIM, J. & PEREIRA C. "On Dividing and Uniting: Ethnicity,
Racism and Nationalism in Africa" Paper for IDIN, Buenos
Aires, 1993.
IGNATIEFF, M. Blood and Belonging: Journeys Into the New
Nationalism, viking, Toronto, 1993.
ILESANMI, S. 0. "Religious Pluralism, Identity and Political
Legitimacy in Nigeria" SOAS Seminar, London, 1992.
ILOGU, C. "The Religious Situation in Nigeria Today: A
Sociological Analysis" in Presence aifricaine. vol. 96 (4),
1975.
ISICHEI, E. (ed) Varieties of Christian Baqierience in Nigeria.
Macmillan, London, 1982.
JOSEPH, R. A. Democracy and Prehandal Politics in Nigeria.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
KUKAH M. H. Religion and Politics In Nigeria Since I960.
Unpublished PhD Thesis, London, 1989.
KUKAH, H. M. "Northern unity: A Shattered Microcosm? The Roots,
Basis and Course of Religious Bigotry" Northern Nigeria in
Perspective, vol. 1, no. 1, 1992.
LAITIN, D. "The Sharia Debate and the Origins of the Second
Nigerian Republic", Journal of Mnrtpra African studies, no.
1082.
LENIN, V. I. On Religion. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1963.
LUDWAR-ENE O. (ed) New Religious Movements and Society in
Nigeria. Bayreuth African Studies Series no. 7, 1991.
MADUNAGU, E. Nigeria: The Political Kronnmy of State Robbery. New
Beacon, London, 1983.
MAHADI, A. and MANGVAT, M. "Some Remarks on the National Question
in Pre-Capitalist Formations: The Case of Nigeria Before
1900 A. D." Paper for National Seminar on the National
Question, Abuja, 1986.
29
MARSHALL, Ruth "<Power in the Name of Jesus>: Social
Transformation and Pentecostalism in Western Nigeria",
mimeo, St. Peters College, Oxford, 1992.
MARX and ENGKLS in Foreign Language Publishing House (ed) Marx
and Enoels on Religion. New York, 1964.
MBEMBE, A. Af'rique indocile: Christlanisme. pouvoir et Etat en
Bocifetfe postcoloniale. Karthala, Paris, 1988.
MEDARD, J-F, "The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa:
Political Clientelism or Neo-Patrimonialism" in C. Clapham
(ed) Private Patronage and Public Power. Pinter, London,
1982.
O'CONNEL, J. "The inevitability of Instability" The Journal of
Modern African Studies, vol 5, no 2, 1967.
OGABA, Oche "The "Middle Belt" and the "North" in Nigerian
Politics" in Northern Nigeria in Perspective, vol. 2 no 1,
1992.
0J0, Mathews "The Growth of Charismatic Movements in Northern
Nigeria" SOAS Seminar, 1992.
0J0, Mathews The Growth of Campus Christianity and Charismatic
Movements in Western Nigeria. Unpublished PhD Thesis,
London, 1986.
OLUKOSHI, Adebayo 0. (ed), The Politics of Structural Adjustment
in Nigeria. London, James Currey, 1993.
0M0YAJ0W0, J. A. Diversity in Unity:: The Development and
Expansion of the Cherubin and Seraphim Church in Nigeria.
University Press of America, Lanbam, 1984.
OSOBA, Segun "The Deepening Crisis of the Nigerian National
Bourgeoisie" Review of African Political Economy. no 13,
1978.
OTHMAN, Shehu, "Nigeria: Power for Profit-Class, Corporatism, and
Factionalism in the Military" in Donal Cruise O'Brien et al
(eds), Contemporary West African States. Cambridge
University Press, 1992.
PADEN, j. Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto. Hudahuda, Zaria,
1986.
PEEL, J. Aladura: A Religious Movement Among the. YorubiiHr Oxford
University Press, London, 1968.
30
RUBBINS, T. "Cults, Converts and Charisma: The Sociology of New
Religious Movements" Current Sociology/ vol 36 no. l, 1988
SALAMONE, F. A. "Becoming Hausa: Ethnic Identity Change and its
Implications For the Study of Ethnic Pluralism and
Stratification" in A. 0. Sanda (ed) Et-.hn.ir Relations in
Nigeria. Sociology Department, University of Ibadan, 1976.
SUBBRU, R. T. "The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: The Travails of
Federalism in Nigeria" Journal of Democracy, vol 4, no 4,
1993.
THEOBALD, Robin "Patrimonialism" world Politica. no 34, 1982.
TUKUR, M- in Abubakar, T. (ed) The Essential Mahmoud. Zaria,
1990.
UKWU I. U. (ed) Federal Character and National Integration.
National Institute, Kuru, 1987.
UMAR, M. s. "Changing Islamic Identity in Nigeria From the 1960's
to the 1980'8: From Sufism to Anti-Sufism" in Brenner, L.
(ed) Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan
Africa, Hurst, London, 1993.
USMAN, Y. B. The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria: 1977-
1987. Vanguard Publishers, Kaduna, 1987.
WILLIAMS, P. A. The State. Religion and Policies in Nigeria.
Unpublished PhD Thesis, Ibadan, 1988.
WUTHNOW, R. "Understanding Religion and Politics" paedaluq. vol.
120 no. 3, 1991.
